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Abstract 
The current research explores the role of two different 
motives underlying volunteering (or defecting) in a simple 
economic game. We find in Study 1 that in a symmetric 
Volunteer’s Dilemma (VoD) the willingness to volunteer is 
reduced more strongly by an increase in the payoff for 
unilateral defection (suggesting more greed) than by an 
increase in the payoff for mutual defection (suggesting less 
fear). In Study 2, we replicate this finding when only the 
participants’ own payoffs are varied, but not when only the 
other player’s payoffs are varied. These findings are 
inconsistent with standard (i.e., Nash) game-theoretic 
predictions and Schelling’s focal-point hypothesis. Instead, 
the empirical patterns suggest that participants approach the 
VoD using egocentric decision heuristics.  
Keywords: Volunteer’s Dilemma, mixed motives, game 
theory, egocentrism  
Introduction 
Whether it is to clear the driveway after a bomb cyclone or 
to call the police after witnessing a murder on the street, a 
society is rife with great and small problems that await 
someone to step up and take action. In facing these 
problems, how do people make a decision of whether to 
volunteer or not? Game theorists use experimental games to 
study interpersonal dilemmas. In the Volunteer’s Dilemma 
(VoD) (Diekmann, 1985), participants choose between 
volunteering and defecting in light of a payoff matrix 
showing the outcomes resulting from all possible 
combinations of choices made by the players (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The payoff matrix for the VoD game (Option A = 
Volunteer, Option B = Defect). 
 
Using Rapoport’s (1967) notation, the choice to volunteer 
(i.e., Option A) yields payoff R (for “Reward”) irrespective 
of the other player’s choice. The payoff for defecting (i.e., 
Option B) depends on the other player’s choice. If the other 
player volunteers, the participant earns payoff T (for 
“Temptation”), but if the other player defects, the payoff is 
P (for “Penalty”). In the VoD, the payoffs are ranked such 
that T > R > P. Classic and psychological game theory 
predicts that the decision to accept the payoff R by 
volunteering is susceptible to the differences T – R and R – 
P. Following Coombs (1973), Dawes et al. (1986) used the 
terms “greed” and “fear” respectively to refer to the desire 
to maximize personal profit (i.e., T – R) and the desire to 
minimize personal loss (i.e., R – P). Research in public 
goods games and other variants of the prisoner’s dilemma – 
where defection is the dominating strategy – has shown that 
increases in the greed parameter have a stronger negative 
effect on cooperation than do reductions in the fear 
parameter (Poppe & Utens, 1986; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 
1989; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). The question that arises is 
whether the same difference holds in the VoD.   
Whereas, in public-goods dilemmas, a reduction of fear 
refers to having a less negative outcome in case of one’s 
unilateral cooperation, a reduction of fear in the VoD refers 
to having a less negative outcome in case of mutual 
defection. It remains to be seen if the difference between the 
greed and the fear effect is the same in the mixed-motive 
VoD than it is in the defection-dominated public-goods or 
prisoner’s dilemma games.  For the present research, we 
therefore modified the VoD by either increasing the payoff 
T (i.e., more greed) or by increasing the payoff P (i.e., less 
fear) relative to a baseline game. In Study 1, these changes 
were effectuated for both players at the same time, whereas 
they were separately done for the self or the other in Study 
2.  
In Study 1, we assessed the willingness to volunteer in a 
baseline condition, in a more-greed condition, and in a less-
fear condition of a two-person VoD with symmetrical 
payoffs. Game theory provides the Nash-equilibrium 
probability of volunteering which renders the other player 
indifferent in the sense that their expected value of 
volunteering is equal to the expected value of defecting. 
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This theoretical benchmark is given by P(V) = (R-P)/(T-P). 
With this, it is possible to generate payoff matrices that are 
game-theoretically equivalent (i.e., yield the same P(V)), 
but affect volunteering either through increases in the T 
payoff (i.e., more greed) or through increases in the P payoff 
(i.e., less fear). In this case, the Nash hypothesis predicts 
that volunteering decreases in the more-greed and the less-
fear conditions by the same amount compared to the 
baseline condition. 
Alternatively, the greed-dominance hypothesis predicts 
that increases in the T payoff (for unilateral defection) 
reduce volunteering more strongly than a game-theoretically 
equivalent increase in the P payoff (for mutual defection). 
This hypothesis is primarily based on empirical findings in 
the public-goods game and its variants (e.g., Dawes et al., 
1986). Its psychological interpretation is rather ad hoc.  
In Study 2, we expanded this investigation by varying 
either the payoffs available to the participating player or the 
payoffs available to the presumed opponent or partner. This 
extension was motivated by both theoretical and real-life 
considerations. In many real-life VoD situations, the cost of 
volunteering (i.e., T – R) may often be assessed in the 
context of total wealth, suggesting an understanding among 
players that the person who stands to gain the most from 
defecting be allowed to realize the gain of payoff T. 
Drawing on Schelling's (1960) seminal analysis (see also 
Harsanyi-Selten, 1988), Diekmann (1993; Przepiorka & 
Diekmann, 2013) studied VoDs with asymmetric payoffs. 
When payoff R was varied for one player, the player with a 
smaller difference T – R was considered “stronger” and 
found to volunteer more often than a comparatively weak 
player. Specifically, Diekmann (1993) suggested the ratio 
T/(T-R) as an index of strength. This “strength” hypothesis 
predicts differences among conditions opposite to the ones 
predicted by classic game theory (see below). Diekmann’s 
(1993) data provided first evidence for the strength 
hypothesis. Varying only the R payoff, Diekmann’s (1993) 
design confounded the effects of increased greed and 
reduced fear. The design of our Study 2 separates these 
motives.   
The design of Study 2 permitted a test of a third 
hypothesis, egocentrism, which states that people approach 
interpersonal dilemmas by first focusing on what they 
themselves stand to gain or lose. Research on the trust 
dilemma shows that participants selectively attend to and 
weight self-relevant information when deciding between the 
uncertainty of trust and the certainty of a small gain 
obtained from distrust (Evans & Krueger, 2011). Recent 
research has uncovered the use of similar egocentric 
heuristics in the VoD (Krueger, Heck, Wagner, in press). In 
this initial work, only the difference T – R (i.e., greed) was 
varied. This variation affected volunteering when it 
occurred for the participant’s own payoffs, but not when it 
occurred for the other person’s payoffs. Despite having full 
access to the information about the other player’s payoffs, 
people were inclined to make volunteering decisions in an 
egocentric manner. 
We have reviewed three theoretical approaches to 
decision-making in the VoD (Nash equilibrium, player’s 
relative “strength,” and heuristic egocentrism). The final 
goal of Study 2 was to test – and potentially replicate – the 
greed-dominance hypothesis (Dawes et al., 1986). We 
predicted that, while being indifferent to the other player’s 
payoff changes, people would be least willing to volunteer 
when their own T payoff rose.  
Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was to explore the effects of reduced 
fear (smaller R – P) and increased greed (larger T – R) on 
volunteering in the VoD. We presented participants with 
three different VoD games — a baseline game and two 
variants, one with a raised T payoff and another with a 
raised P payoff. Participants reported how much they were 
inclined to choose one of the two options. According to the 
Nash hypothesis, there would be less willingness to 
volunteer in the two modified conditions, compared to the 
baseline condition, with no difference between the two 
(because the payoffs in these two conditions were arranged 
to yield the same Nash equilibrium probability). According 
to the greed-dominance hypothesis, however, willingness to 
volunteer should be lower when T rather than when P 
increased. Table 1 shows a schematic diagram of the 
predicted results in directional terms.  
 
Table 1. Predicted results in Study 1. 
 
The Likelihood of Volunteering
Nash Baseline > Less fear = More greed
Greed-Dominance Baseline > Less fear > More greed  
Method 
Participants Participants (N = 392) were recruited on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) for a flat payment of $1 
each. Such modest payments do not appear to threaten the 
validity of the findings in experimental games (Amir, Rand, 
& Kobi Gal, 2012; Krueger et al., in press). One participant 
did not complete the study and 74 failed to pass all 3 
comprehension check questions. We analyzed the responses 
of the remaining 317 participants (Nmale = 180, Nfemale = 136, 
Nother = 1, Mage = 34.66, SDage = 10.29). Study 1 had a one-
way (3 Game Type: baseline vs. more greed vs. less fear) 
within-subjects design.  
 
Materials All participants responded to the three versions 
of the VoD game: baseline, more greed, and less fear 
(Figure 2). The more-greed game comprised a T payoff that 
was $10 higher for each player than it was in the baseline 
condition. The less-fear game comprised a P payoff that was 
increased by $5 for each player. This way, according to the 
Nash mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability of 
volunteering was the same in the more-greed and less-fear 
conditions, P(V) = 0.33, while being smaller than that of the 
baseline condition, P(V) = 0.50. 
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Figure 2. Study 1. Symmetric VoD games (Player 1 = 
Participants). 
 
Procedure After completing a separate study on self-
enhancement, participants were informed that they would 
play 3 different games with another person. In playing the 3 
different games, they were asked to make their decisions for 
each game independent from the other games. All 
participants were first presented with the baseline game, and 
the order of the more-greed game and the less-fear game 
was counterbalanced. After reviewing the payoff matrix, 
participants indicated their preference on a bipolar 8-point 
rating scale of Very likely to choose Option A (1) - A bit 
likely to choose Option A (4) - A bit likely to choose Option 
B (5) - Very likely to choose Option B (8). Next, they 
answered a comprehension check question, which asked 
them to choose the most likely final outcomes (payoffs) 
from the 4 possible outcomes based on their decisions. At 
the end of the study, they answered demographic questions 
about their age, gender, and so on.  
 
Results and Discussion 
So that higher ratings reflect higher likelihoods of 
choosing Option A (Volunteer), we reverse-coded 
respondents’ ratings by subtracting them from 9. We then 
performed a one-way within-subjects analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with two a priori contrasts. The first contrast 
compared the baseline condition with the composite of the 
more-greed and the less-fear conditions; the second contrast 
compared the more-greed and the less-fear conditions. 
As shown in Figure 3, the analyses revealed that, 
compared with the baseline condition (M = 6.85, SD = 
1.87), participants were less likely to volunteer in the 
composite of the more-greed and the less-fear conditions (M 
= 6.24, SD = 2.26), F (1, 316) = 33.47, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .096, 
d = .30. Next, we found that participants were less likely to 
volunteer in the more-greed condition (M = 6.04, SD = 2.41) 
than in the less-fear condition (M = 6.44, SD = 2.09), F (1, 
316) = 9.40, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .029, d = .17. Thus, there was 
empirical support for the greed-dominance hypothesis, 
while the data were also partially consistent with the Nash 
hypothesis.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 1. Mean rating of the likelihood of 
volunteering in each game. Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Next, we dichotomized the data such that ratings between 
1 and 4 to 0 were coded as intended defection and ratings 
between 5 and 8 to 1 were coded as intended volunteering. 
Table 2 shows the evidence for the greed-dominance 
hypothesis in that the probability of volunteering is 
nominally the lowest in the more-greed condition. In 
addition, there is a considerable discrepancy between the 
overall probability of volunteering and game-theoretic 
benchmarks (Nash). This discrepancy exceeds earlier 
reports of over-volunteering (Krueger, Ullrich, & Chen, 
2016; Krueger, et al., in press). 
 
Table 2. A comparison between the probability of 
volunteering based on the Nash equilibrium and the actual 
proportions of volunteering in Study 1. 
 
Nash Data
Baseline 0.5 0.87
More Greed 0.33 0.74
Less Fear 0.33 0.82  
 
Study 2 
The canonical approach used in Study 1 conflated the 
motives of the two players. In Study 2, we modified the 
experimental design by varying the T (greed) or the P (fear) 
payoffs for one player at a time.  While the baseline game 
retained its symmetrical structure, the more-greed and the 
less-fear games were separated into a self-varied version 
(i.e., only Player 1’s payoff was modified) and an other-
varied version (i.e., only Player 2’s payoff was modified). 
With this modification, we could evaluate 4 distinct 
predictions about respondents’ readiness to volunteer. First, 
the Nash hypothesis predicts that respondents will be less 
likely to volunteer when the other player’s T or P payoffs 
are increased. Variations in the player’s own payoffs should 
have no effect. 
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Second, the “strength” hypothesis, which is derived from 
Diekmann’s (1993) elaboration of Schelling’s (1960) theory 
of strategic conflict, sharply conflicts with the Nash 
hypothesis. Using Diekmann’s ratio of T/(T-R) to index a 
player’s “strength” (i.e., tolerance of sacrifice), this 
hypothesis states that in the self-varied versions of the more-
greed and the less-fear conditions, the strength of Player 2 
(ratio = 2.0) is stronger than that of Player 1 (ratio = 1.5). 
Therefore, respondents (who are Player 1) should be less 
likely to volunteer in these conditions than in the baseline 
condition, where both players are equally strong. 
Conversely, respondents should be more likely to volunteer 
in the more-greed and the less-fear conditions than in the 
baseline condition, when the other player’s payoffs are 
varied. This prediction is the opposite of the prediction 
derived from the Nash hypothesis.  
Third, the egocentrism hypothesis (Evans & Krueger, 
2011; Krueger, 2014) foresees no differences in the 
likelihood of volunteering when the other player’s payoffs 
are varied. However, if respondents are, as predicted, 
selectively sensitive to variations in their own potential 
payoffs, the likelihood of volunteering should be lower in 
the more-greed and in the less-fear condition than in the 
baseline condition.  
Fourth, the greed-dominance hypothesis predicts that an 
increase in the T payoff has a stronger impact than an 
increase in the P payoff. The pure version of this hypothesis 
is that this difference should only be seen when the 
respondent’s own payoffs vary. The greed-dominance 
hypothesis is, in other words, a subset of the egocentrism 
hypothesis. Table 3 displays the predictions of the 4 
hypotheses schematically.  
 
Table 3. Predicted results in Study 2. B stands for Baseline; 
LF stands for Less Fear; MG stands for MG. 
   
Self-varied Other-varied
Nash B = LF = MG B > LF = MG
Strength B > LF = MG B < LF = MG 
Egocentrism B > LF = MG B = LF = MG
Egocentrism
w/ Greed-dominance
B > LF > MG B = LF = MG
The Likelihood of Volunteering
 
Method 
Participants Three hundred and fifty-one participants took 
part in Study 2 via MTurk for a flat payment of $0.75 each. 
Of these, 36 participants failed all 3 comprehension check 
questions and 1 participant did not complete the task. We 
analyzed the data of the remaining 314 participants (Nmale = 
174, Nfemale = 138, Nother = 2, Mage = 35.19, SDage = 10.62). 
The experimental design was a 3 (Game Type: baseline vs. 
more greed vs. less fear) by 2 (Asymmetry Target: self-
varied vs. other-varied) within-subjects design.  
Materials The baseline game, which serves as a frame of 
reference, was the same as in Study 1. In the self-varied 
version of the more-greed game, the payoff T for Player 1 
was raised by $10, while Player 2’s payoff T was identical 
to the payoff T in the baseline game. In the self-varied 
version of the less-fear game, the payoff P for Player 1 was 
increased by $5 but Player 2’s payoff P remained to be $10. 
These changes resulted in identical adjustments in the game-
theoretic benchmarks (Nash). The other-varied versions of 
the more-greed and the less-fear games were made in the 
same way, except that it was the payoff for Player 2 that was 
modified (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Study 2. Asymmetric VoD games (Player 1 = 
Participants). 
Procedure Participants first received the instructions on 
how to play the games and then viewed a sample payoff 
matrix before responding to 3 comprehension check 
questions. Participants had to select the cases in which their 
payoffs would be the highest and lowest, and the other 
player’s payoffs would be the highest. 
In the experiment proper, participants were presented with 
the same baseline game twice and the more-greed and the 
less-fear games in both versions of Target Asymmetry (a 
total of 6 games). They were instructed to make their 
decisions for every game independent from the other games. 
The presentation order of the self-varied versions of the 
more-greed and the less-fear games and the other-varied 
versions of the more-greed and the less-fear games was 
counterbalanced across participants. Within each type of 
Asymmetry Target (self-varied vs. other-varied), the 
presentation order of the more-greed and the less-fear games 
was also counterbalanced. However, the first game was 
always the baseline game. As the fourth game, right before 
switching to one of the two versions of Asymmetry Target 
games, we presented the baseline game again to reinstate the 
same reference before they would be introduced to the 
games with a new target of asymmetry. An example 
presentation order of the 6 games is as follows: 1
st
 baseline, 
1917
2
nd
 more-greed in the self-varied version, 3
rd
 less-fear in the 
self-varied version, 4
th
 baseline, 5
th
 more-greed in the other-
varied version, 6
th
 less-fear in the other-varied version. 
For each game, participants were shown the payoff matrix 
and prompted to indicate, between Option A and Option B, 
which option they would choose, using again a bipolar 8-
point rating scale of Very likely to choose Option A (1) - A 
bit likely to choose Option A (4) - A bit likely to choose 
Option B (5) - Very likely to choose Option B (8). 
Results and Discussion 
We subtracted each rating from 9 before submitting the 
data to one-way (3 Game Type: baseline vs. more greed vs. 
less fear) repeated measures ANOVAs, one for the   self-
varied versions of the games and another for the other-
varied versions. As in Study 1, we specified two contrasts 
for Game Type. One contrast compared the baseline 
condition with the composite of the more-greed and the less-
fear conditions; the other contrast compared the more-greed 
condition with the less-fear condition. We also ascertained 
that there was no significant difference between the first 
baseline game and the second baseline game (p = .24). We 
therefore used the averaged responses in the two baseline 
games to represent the baseline.  
In the self-varied versions of the game, we found that, 
compared to the baseline condition (M = 5.57, SD = 2.71), 
the rated likelihood to volunteer was lower in the composite 
of the more-greed and the less-fear conditions (M = 4.82, 
SD = 2.78), F (1, 313) = 48.86, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14, d = .35. 
Although the likelihood of volunteering was nominally 
lower in the more-greed condition (M = 4.69, SD = 2.73) 
than the less-fear condition (M = 4.95, SD = 2.84), this 
difference was not statistically significant. Thus, the results 
from the self-varied versions of the VoD games were 
consistent with the strength hypothesis and the egocentrism 
hypothesis, but not with the Nash hypothesis.  
Analyses of the other-varied versions of the games 
revealed an additional support for the egocentrism theory. 
Here we found that none of the comparisons were 
statistically significant. As shown in the right panel of 
Figure 5, when the more-greed and the less-fear 
manipulation was applied to the other player’s payoff, 
participants distinguished neither the baseline condition (M 
= 5.57, SD = 2.71) from the composite of the more-greed 
and the less-fear conditions (M = 5.54, SD = 2.74) nor the 
more-greed (M = 5.50, SD = 2.71) from the less-fear 
conditions (M = 5.58, SD = 2.69). This pattern is strikingly 
inconsistent with the Nash hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Study 2. Mean rating of the likelihood of 
volunteering in each game. Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. The blue lines represent the 
average of the two baseline conditions. 
 
In the next step, we calculated the proportions of 
volunteering after dichotomizing the ratings.  Table 4 shows 
that there was again evidence for over-volunteering. 
However, in the self-varied versions of the more-greed and 
the less-fear conditions, the Nash-based probabilities and 
the actual proportions of volunteering are similar. This may 
suggest that the Nash hypothesis has a certain degree of 
predictive power. But, at the broader level, the Nash-based 
predictions were still unsupported because the proportions 
of volunteering were higher in the other-varied versions of 
the games compared to the self-varied versions of the 
games. Considering that the overall proportions of 
volunteering in all the conditions went down in Study 2 
compared to those in Study 1, the close match between the 
Nash-based theoretical probabilities and the actual 
proportions in the self-varied versions of the games in Study 
2 may be the artifact of the decreased volunteering in all the 
conditions. Yet, it is unclear why the proportions of 
volunteering were less in Study 2 than in Study 1. 
 
Table 4. A comparison between the probability of 
volunteering based on the Nash equilibrium and the actual 
proportions of volunteering in Study 2. 
 
Nash Data
Baseline 0.5 0.66
More Greed 0.5 0.5
Less Fear 0.5 0.55
More Greed 0.33 0.65
Less Fear 0.33 0.68
Self-varied
Other-varied
 
 
General Discussion 
The main purpose of this research was to investigate the 
relative impact of two potential motives concerning 
volunteering versus defecting. We operationalized ‘greed’ 
as the difference between the payoff for unilateral defection 
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(T) and the payoff for volunteering (R). We operationalized 
‘fear’ as the differences between R and the payoff for 
mutual defection (P). To equalize the two with regard to 
their implications for a change in the Nash equilibrium, the 
change in T for the increase in greed had to be numerically 
twice as large as the change in P for the reduction of fear. 
Participants’ choices may have been inordinately affected 
by these differences in nominal values, which would 
represent the operation of a cognitive-perceptual factor 
independent of the motivational implication of these 
differences. This possibility remains to be investigated.  
To review: Study 1 supported the greed-dominance 
hypothesis in that the likelihood of volunteering decreased 
more with an increase in the T payoff than with an increase 
in the P payoff. This result is inconsistent with game-
theoretic predictions informed by the Nash equilibrium.  
Study 2 yielded weaker support for the greed-dominance 
hypothesis, but again shed doubt on the game-theoretic 
Nash hypothesis. The critical design feature of Study 2 was 
the separation – and hence unconfounding – of differences 
in the participants’ own payoffs and differences in the other 
players’ payoffs. The calculation of the Nash equilibrium 
strategies from one player’s point of view involves the other 
player’s payoffs because the definitional feature of the Nash 
equilibrium is that it holds the other player in a state of 
indifference between available strategies. Overall, we found 
a strong tendency for over-volunteering relative to game-
theoretic benchmarks. The over-volunteering effect may 
have been exacerbated by the hypothetical nature of the 
game, but it deserves note that the available strategic 
options were labeled neutrally (Options A and B).  
In contrast to game-theoretic rationale, participants were 
sensitive to differences in their own potential payoffs, while 
ignoring the other player’s payoffs. This pattern is in line 
with recent theory and research on the use of egocentric 
heuristics in strategic interaction (Krueger, 2014). The 
neglect of others’ payoffs also ran counter to the 
Schellingian “strength” hypothesis, according to which any 
payoff change is relevant for the assessment of differences 
in players’ ability to tolerate a loss or forego a gain.  
A puzzle remains: How is it that ordinary people and 
research participants readily perceive the VoD in moral 
terms, identifying the decision to volunteer with “the right 
choice” (Heck & Krueger, 2017), while at the same time 
bringing a pronounced egocentric orientation to the 
judgment task? Related research on interpersonal trust 
(Evans & Krueger, 2011) and the prisoner’s dilemma 
(Krueger, 2014) points in a similar direction. We speculate 
that what we have here is a pseudo-problem, namely the 
idea that prosocial behavior and outcomes demand prosocial 
mental processes. Conceptually, the two are separable, 
thereby allowing the empirical patterns we observe. The 
optimistic interpretation is that the social good may be 
achieved without necessarily having to turn individuals 
against their own material interests.    
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